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Abstract: Business activities play a major role in biodiversity loss and, as a result, firms are under 
increasing pressures from stakeholders to reduce their negative impacts on living systems. In 
response, business attitudes, behaviors and strategies regarding biodiversity are progressively 
changing, suggesting that interactions between business and biodiversity could go beyond the 
search of a compromise between development and conservation. This paper proposes an 
analysis of business perceptions regarding biodiversity. In its first part, we discuss how 
biodiversity is usually perceived as an external environmental constraint on business 
activities, and how economic tools may be used for arbitrages in that context. Building upon 
our work on the Business and Biodiversity Interdependence Indicator (BBII), we then discuss 
how assessing a firm’s interdependences with biodiversity may bring about new business 
strategies and practices. We propose a typology of firm behavior regarding biodiversity and 
ecosystem services (BES), discuss business opportunities and property rights issues pertaining 
to markets for ecosystem services and propose preliminary conceptual foundations of new 
business standards needed to reverse current biodiversity trends.  
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1 – INTRODUCTION  
 
During the past few decades, firms have been under increasing pressures from 
stakeholders to reduce their impacts on the environment. Ecological issues have become key 
strategic variables for them, notably in terms of disclosures (Cho and Patten, 2006; Cormier et 
al., 1993) now mandatory in many countries (e.g. New Economic Regulation law for France 
from 2001). Bellini (2003) argues that businesses have progressively taken environmental 
issues into account under the impulsion of three types of arbitrage: legislative or normative, 
economic and technical. Within that context, biodiversity is still an emerging issue for most 
businesses. A real awareness of the links between business and biodiversity loss is of concern 
mainly to large corporations and multinationals, the businesses most visible to the general 
public and those directly involved with living systems such as agribusiness. These are the 
ones most likely to be subject to pressure from stakeholders, including non-governmental 
organisations, local communities and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rating agencies. 
Since decision VIII/17 was taken in Curitiba in March 2006 at COP 8 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), the business community has been asked, through the launch of 
the “Business and Biodiversity” initiative, to contribute actively to the objectives of the CBD. 
Supported by the European Commission, this initiative calls for the adoption of best practices 
to reduce the impacts of businesses on biodiversity and promote its conservation. 
Business attitudes, behaviors and strategies regarding biodiversity are progressively 
changing. Our approach to understanding interactions between businesses and biodiversity 
seeks to be complementary to measures and mechanisms for biodiversity conservation. In this 
paper, we do not discuss corporate responsibility towards nature3 but seek to analyze how 
changing perceptions regarding biodiversity influence business strategies and practices. First, 
we study (a) how business usually perceive biodiversity, that is as an external environmental 
constraint on its activities (impact mitigation approach), and (b) what (and how) tools may be 
used for arbitrages in that context. Building upon our work on the Business and Biodiversity 
Interdependence Indicator (BBII), we then discuss how assessing a firm’s interdependence 
with biodiversity may bring about new business strategies and practices. We propose a 
typology of firm behavior regarding biodiversity and ecosystem services (BES), discuss 
business opportunities and property rights issues pertaining to BES markets and propose 
preliminary conceptual foundations of new business standards needed to reverse current 
biodiversity trends. 
 
 
2- BIODIVERSITY UNDERSTOOD AS AN ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINT ON BUSINESS ACTIVITY  
 
 
2.1 Internalizing environmental externalities  
  
From a neoclassical perspective where the field of economics is defined as the science 
of allocating rare means or resources to alternative uses (Robbins 1932), our environment is 
seen as an exception to typical collective goods, one for which consumption by an agent may 
lead to the degradation of the good itself. The choice of the term ‘environment’ is not neutral: 
the “environment” belongs to no one in particular, while components of ecosystems, whether 
exhaustible or renewable, may be appropriated by individuals or firms, potentially generating 
externalities. Environmental problems, understood as negative market externalities, hence put 
into question the Pareto optimums associated with supposed perfectly competitive markets. 
                                                 
3 See Bazin (2009) for a recent analysis of associated theoretical paradigms 
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The lack of price signals likely to be integrated into the decision-making processes of 
economic agents fosters the need to internalize environmental externalities. This led to the 
development of the field of environmental economics, with at its theoretical core the 
evaluation of variations in consumer surplus so as to help individuals reveal their preferences 
(Pearce and Markandya, 1989). As environmental externalities have materialized into 
predominant collective preoccupations, neoclassicists have strived towards finding the 
adequate allocation rules, and associated management systems, for their internalization 
(Vivien 1994; Panayotou 1994). On the one hand, Pigou’s approach (1920), based on the 
difference between private and social costs, seeks under state control to find the optimum 
pollution level through a taxation mechanism (polluter pays principle). This calls for the use 
of cost-benefit analyses (CBA) which do not necessitate a clear environmental aim. On the 
other hand, the Coasian tradition (1960) poses the problem in a different way as it seeks to 
maximize the value of collective production, by minimizing production and transactions costs. 
Further developments of the theory of externalities have focused on the implications of 
Coase’s theorem in terms of property rights, transaction costs and institutional arrangements, 
hence looking at the efficiency of arbitrage between economic agents (Ragni 1992; Vivien 
1994). Complementary families of economic tools have been tested so far: taxes, subsidies, 
quotas, prohibitions, norms, licenses to operate, property rights, rights markets, tradable 
permits. These measures are implemented to limit actions of agents and/or to help agents find 
the solutions themselves.  
Biodiversity, defined as the dynamics of the interactions between organisms in 
environments subject to change, has only recently been analyzed through the lenses of the 
theory of externalities. The concepts of ecosystem processes, function, services and benefits 
have been useful to help us understand how biodiversity contributes to economy and social 
welfare (MA, 2005). According to Perrings et al. (2009), “…humans derive benefits from 
consumptive and non-consumptive use of ecosystem services”. Yet, benefits from the latter 
may be negatively impacted by ecosystem degradation generated by the biodiversity 
externalities of consumptive use of ecosystem services (ES). Conflicts can arise with respect 
to the use of a resource or ecosystem (e.g. fisheries, livestock farming) which poses the 
‘classical’ challenge of limiting free access to resources. This refers to what Hardin (1968) 
incorrectly named the “tragedy of the commons”; in reality it is the “tragedy of free access” 
(Weber and Revéret, 1993; Ostrom et al., 2002), since common property rights prohibit free 
access. Conflicts can also arise with respect to the same resource or ecosystem. This is due to. 
interactions between agents with respect to (a) interactions of different uses and (b) their 
impacts on other ES, both at a local level (e.g. use values for local communities and tourists) 
and more global one (e.g. option and existence values) (Trommetter et al., 2008). For 
instance, trees may be used for their wood (lumbering, collecting firewood) but also for their 
leaves, bark, fruits or genetic materials (cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, food products). 
Biodiversity externalities in ecosystem services relate to market-driven actions, whose welfare 
effects are ignored, that impact the well-being of either consumers or producers by altering 
the ecological functioning on which consumption or production depends (Crocker and 
Tschirhart, 1992). Perrings et al. (2009) further argue that biodiversity conservation, an 
undersupplied public good if left to the market, requires two problems to be solved. Firstly, 
the problem of local market failure associated with the local public goods and biodiversity 
externalities - where the loss of ecosystems services is driven by biodiversity change (MA, 
2005) - and, secondly, that of international market failure linked to international biodiversity 
conservation efforts (genetic diversity as a global public good ; Trommetter and Weber, 2003) 
and the externalities of international trade. Both require economic agents to take the full costs 
of their actions into consideration through the development of appropriate institutional and 
financing mechanisms. 
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2.2 A business perspective: the competitiveness – environment debate  
 
The mandatory or negotiated implementation of tools for internalizing environmental 
externalities gave rise to the controversy ‘competitiveness versus environment’ (Boiral and 
Jolly, 1992; Walley and Whitehead, 1994). Within this debate, two approaches have been 
regularly opposed. On the one hand, a win-lose perspective (Boyd and McCelland, 1999) 
considers that, with increasing regulatory and societal pressures, firms cannot ignore anymore 
their negative environmental externalities without risking losing their legitimacy or license to 
operate (Boiral and Jolly, 1992). The resulting costs they incur, seen as proportional to the 
intensity of external pressures, cannot be easily avoided, and far outweigh the environmental 
benefits. Environmental issues, through notably industrial and regulatory norms, are 
considered as external constraints which often necessitate substantial investments with 
minimal or negative returns, notwithstanding the associated reductions in productivity 
(Walley and Whitehead, 1994).  
On the other hand, a win-win approach, also known as the Porter Hypothesis, has 
attempted to demonstrate the advantages of environmental actions undertaken by firms, 
invalidating the orthodoxy of negative causality between competitiveness and the 
internalization of environmental concerns (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Advantages 
commonly put forward include reductions in energy and material consumption, improvement 
of corporate image, access to new markets, and technological innovations. Jaffe and Palmer 
(1997) have presented three distinct variants of the Porter Hypothesis, some studies providing 
further support for these (e.g. Lanoie et al., 2007): (1) environmental regulation stimulates 
certain kinds of environmental innovations (weak version) ; (2) flexible environmental policy 
regimes give firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations, such as 
technology-based standards (narrow version) and (3) properly designed regulation may induce 
cost-saving innovation that more than compensates for the cost of compliance (strong 
version).  
The origin of the controversy lies both in the complexity of environmental problems 
and the arbitrariness of cost-benefit analyses (CBAs; Boiral 2005), and / or cost-efficiency 
analyses (CEAs) undertaken by firms. Arbitrage between various options depends on factors 
which are both contingent and contextual of each situation or firm. Accordingly, various 
variables need to be analyzed:  
(a) The role of industrial and business excellence in environmental performance: 
environmental initiatives are often inseparable from the normal routines, methods and 
organisation of the workplace designed to improve productivity and competitiveness 
(Sharistava 1995). For instance, measures favourable to biodiversity (e.g. specific bird 
species) may be intrinsically linked to specific farming practices (e.g. timing of mowing 
practices; McLaughlin and Mineau, 1995; Muller 2002). 
(b) The distinction between preventive and corrective action (Boiral 2005; Jasch 
2008): corrective action corresponds to measures undertaken after opening an industrial plant, 
such as process redesign to control or reduce pollution. Research supporting the “win-lose” 
hypothesis is typically based on comparative analysis of this type of investment (water 
pollution remediation systems, particulate filters), because it relies on parameters 
(environmental costs) which can easily be isolated. Preventive action, in contrast, refers to 
technical and organisational innovations integrated into production methods before the start of 
their life cycle, at the initial design stage. They are often indistinguishable from measures 
aimed at improved productivity and efficiency. While corrective action generally requires 
expensive investment with a minimal increase in profitability or competitiveness, preventive 
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action can be both economically and environmentally attractive, and thus an advantageous 
alternative, depending on the activity or business in question. 
(c) The marginal decrease in the effectiveness of environmental actions: the costs and 
efficiency of environmental action, whether preventive or corrective, depend directly on the 
level of pollution remediation projected by the business. Beyond certain thresholds, the costs 
can turn out to be quite prohibitive (Salamitou 1989), while the results can be uncertain.  
(d) The duration / life cycle of assets: An asset is said to be specific when its use-value 
would be lower in uses other than that for which it is intended in the initial investment 
(Williamson 1981). An asset is highly specific when it cannot be converted to other uses 
without imposing a significant loss of productive value on its holder. Riordan and Williamson 
(1985) argue that there are five categories of specific assets: (1) localised assets which cannot 
be reused elsewhere without incurring high costs, because of the necessary proximity of 
production operations, (2) physical assets, such as equipment designed for a specific type of 
production and not reusable elsewhere, (3) intangible assets which reflect emotional 
attachments, such as customer loyalty, (4) human resources with specific expertise gained in 
the course of doing work and (5) dedicated assets which are in principle transferable but for 
which there is no demand apart from the transaction that led to their acquisition. According to 
Godard and Hommel (2001), the specificity of assets limits the options for re-deploying them. 
They argue there is a continuum of levels of asset engagement. At one end, the absence of 
sunk costs allows for an engagement that is reversible at will, in the short term, in a perfectly 
contestable market. At the other end, the business is engaged ‘for all time’ in markets which 
are not fully contestable owing to the presence of sunk costs.  
(e) The dependence of CBAs / CEAs on the modes of regulation, incentives and 
property rights in force: if sources of pollution fall under clearly established property rights, it 
is socially optimal to make the polluters pay (Coase 1960). Inversely, if pollution sources are 
diffuse and associated with an unclear property rights regime, it will be socially optimal to 
make society pay. Similarly, if a premium is put on deforestation combined with the growing 
of export crops, it is understandable that refraining from exploiting an old-growth forest so as 
to convert it to a lucrative monoculture is equivalent to the incurring of an opportunity cost 
for the business in question.  
With water, soil and air quality, and more recently climate change, at the heart of 
stakeholders’ concerns, most (historical and) current business environmental efforts or 
measures (have) target(ed) indirect drivers of ecosystem - and hence biodiversity - change, 
that is emissions, pollutions and waste. Within this context, biodiversity is usually understood 
as a new, additional form of external environmental pressure, most firms lacking the vision of 
“nature evolving” promoted by Holling et al. (2002). For business, biodiversity is linked 
essentially to regulatory frameworks overseeing where and how - though to a lesser extent - 
business activities can operate.  
 
2.3 Valuing biodiversity and ecosystem services for CBAs   
 
At the heart of the ‘competitiveness – environment’ debate lies the use of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA), notably for land-use decisions relative to the appraisal of industrial projects 
by public authorities. Businesses perform them in order to calculate optimal pollution or 
damage levels, using cost-efficiency criteria contingent to norms defined by public authorities 
(Vivien 1994; Boiral 2005). Expanding CBAs to take account of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services (BES) requires the pricing of their economic value and, more precisely, capturing 
their marginal economic value for trade-offs purposes (Braat and ten Brick, 2008). As argued 
by Ruhl et al. (2007), “failure to refine our understanding of their value, and the consequent 
inability to account for those values in regulatory and market settings and, more important, in 
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the public mind, is unlikely to promote their conservation”. The total economic value of 
biodiversity is traditionally divided into its use values (direct use value, indirect use value, 
option value) and non-use values (existence value and bequest value), with a gradient of 
decreasing tangibility as one moves from direct use values to existence values (Barbier 1989; 
Freeman 1993; Pearce and Turner, 1989). According to Perrings et al. (2009), “maximizing 
societal welfare calls for understanding the tradeoffs between the net benefits from 
consumptive and non-consumptive use of ecosystem services, and the costs that these uses 
create in the form of biodiversity externalities that can diminish future ecosystem services.” 
Valuation techniques for BES may be grouped into four types (de Groot et al., 2002): (a) 
direct market valuation, (b) indirect market valuation (avoided cost, replacement cost, factor 
income, travel cost, hedonic pricing), (c) contingent valuation and (d) group valuation. Their 
use can be helpful towards assessing the full cost of proposed projects (Turner and Daily, 
2007). CBA analyses coupled to BES valuation may allow businesses and stakeholders to 
account for BES loss, especially for indirect ones such as that caused by raw material 
suppliers or by the indirect impacts of a proposed project (e.g. new town needed to be built so 
as to supply the labour force of a new mine).  
Yet, despite numerous efforts to capture their economic value (e.g. Azqueta and 
Sotelsek, 2007; Costanza et al., 2007; Curtis 2004; Howart and Farber, 2002; Turner et al., 
2003; Wilson and Hoehn, 2006), BES may not easily be priced, that is translated into a 
monetary proxy for market internalization and put into boxes such as “goods”, “services” and 
“capital” (Dasgupta 2001; Farber, et al., 2002; Heal 1998; Wallace 2007). Major components 
of BES do not give rise to market transactions, which means relying on non-market valuation 
techniques for CBAs. Each tool has its methodological limitations, notably in terms of 
underlying assumptions. For instance, concerns with contingent valuation relate to the 
reproduction of protocols and the comparative analysis of results across time and space 
(Bonnieux 1998; Kumar and Kumar, 2008; Weber 2002a). Biases are also associated with 
benefit transfer techniques applied to the results of studies based on one or more valuation 
techniques (e.g. Costanza et al., 1997; Troy and Wilson, 2006; Turner et al., 2007; Wilson and 
Hoehn, 2006). As argued by Nelson et al. (2009), they incorrectly assume that “every hectare 
of a given habitat type is of equal value – regardless of its quality, rarity, spatial 
configuration, size, proximity to population centres, or the prevailing social practices and 
values”. Moreover, economic valuation of BES is an anthropocentric approach grounded on 
‘weak sustainability’, that is the substitutability between different forms of capital (Pearce et 
al., 1990; Godard 1995). Depending on the aims and context of the study (e.g. questions asked 
to interviewees) and the methodological assumptions of the model used (e.g. chosen discount 
rate), the marginal value of an additional BES unit would vary considerably, and in some 
circumstance be particularly low (e.g. Simpson et al., 1996; though this approach is 
controversial as it supposes a high substitutability between genetic resources - Sarr et al., 
2008). This would even truer within the context of most CBAs of highly lucrative industrial 
projects, hence some stakeholders arguing that the total economic value of biodiversity 
(inclusive of that of ecosystem services), though useful, is not sufficient for arbitrage 
(especially for ‘remarkable biodiversity’; Chevassus-au-Louis et al., 2009). 
 
2.4 The business – biodiversity interface from a regulatory perspective 
 
For most firms, internalizing biodiversity externalities is an issue pertaining to 
regulations and is thus essentially associated with emissions, resource and land use 
restrictions, such as water pollution levels, harvesting quotas (fisheries) and areas set aside to 
protect biodiversity. From a legal and land-use perspective, biodiversity may be divided into 
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(a) ‘remarkable biodiversity’4, to which existence values are attached and / or for which some 
sort of protection status exists, and (b) ‘ordinary biodiversity’, which contributes to varying 
degrees to ecosystem functioning and ecosystem services and for which no direct protection is 
offered (Chevassus-au-Louis et al., 2009). Furthermore, three types of situations may be 
proposed for the business – biodiversity interface: 
1. No or extremely limited business opportunity or activity allowed within or 
close to areas harboring ‘remarkable biodiversity’ so as to protect biodiversity from its 
negative impacts (e.g. national parks, species protected from trade, exploitation and / or 
destruction). 
2. Areas containing both ordinary and remarkable biodiversity, where business 
opportunities, development models and choices, as well as the use of and access to renewable 
and exhaustible resources, are negotiated with stakeholders so as not to compromise the 
viability of biodiversity (e.g. Natura 2000 sites in Europe, UNESCO’s biosphere reserves 
network), including its components key to local communities from a cultural perspective. 
3. Other areas which do not have any protection status and where impacts on 
ordinary biodiversity are addressed - often indirectly - through complementary regulations 
such as mandatory Environmental Impact Assessments, statutory norms for waste, emissions 
and pollutions, and legislative frameworks with regard to the prevention and remedying of 
environmental damage (e.g. EU’s Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability). 
In other words, different decision-making processes would apply whether the 
(proposed) business activity threatens ordinary biodiversity or biodiversity elements which 
are protected by law and / or are important to local community groups. Its social acceptability 
or legitimacy may not necessarily be linked to values which can be priced and put in 
aggregate formats (Chevassus-au-Louis et al., 2009; Gobert 2008). It would be contingent to 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the interactions between the (proposed) business activity and 
specific BES components, in reference to other value systems and social needs (e.g. 
empowerment strategies - Bacqué 2005; environmental justice - Schlosberg 2005).  
Within this context, conventional business strategy amounts essentially at identifying, 
assessing, monitoring and mitigating the impacts of business activities, projects or ventures on 
biodiversity (Tucker 2006), especially on its components protected by law or those important 
to legitimate stakeholders. As argued by Stigler (1971), when it comes to regulations, firms, 
often through business lobbies or associations of firms (Viardot 1993; Roy and Whelan, 
1992), seek to optimize their behaviour given the rules which are imposed on their business 
operations, and may attempt to manipulate them to their own advantage (strategic lobbying; 
Regulatory Capture Theory). The goal is to legitimize the activity under stakeholder scrutiny, 
often using (1) CBAs of project alternatives for arbitrages (see its limitations previously 
underlined), and (2) impact mitigation procedures at the lowest possible financial and social 
cost.  
For preexisting business activities, this would involve at best a cost-effectiveness 
approach with respect to new negotiated or mandatory ecological goals linked to changes in 
practices, for instance compensation payments for costs incurred due to compulsory 
conservation constraints (e.g. Hackl et al., 2007). For new business projects, a “no net loss” 
five-stage approach is being promoted, notably by the Business and Biodiversity Offset 
Program (2009) and the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA 2005). It 
involves (a) avoiding irreversible losses of biodiversity (prevention), (b) seeking alternative 
solutions to minimize losses, (c) using mitigation to restore biodiversity, (d) compensating for 
                                                 
4 One might question whether this is the appropriate terminology. Given the contingent nature of ‘remarkable 
biodiversity’, we would argue that it might be nothing more than biodiversity elements noticed by law, human 
communities and / or specific professional groups. 
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residual, unavoidable loss by providing substitutes of at least similar biodiversity value, and 
(e) seeking opportunities for enhancement. This approach, focused on business impacts on 
biodiversity, has lead to the development of mitigation mechanisms, hybrid tools involving 
both markets and state regulation. 
 
2.5 The role played by mitigation mechanisms 
 
Trommetter et al. (2008) argue that there are three alternatives for mitigating of BES 
loss: avoided or minimized mitigation, self-realized mitigation and externalized mitigation. 
Though this would depend on the country and its regulatory framework, any business could 
theoretically be subject to mitigation measures when it proposes a new development project, 
hence its need to arbitrate between the three options aforementioned, most likely according to 
the risks and costs contingent to each situation.  
(a) Avoided mitigation relates to operations carried out with no impact on biodiversity 
and ecosystem services benefiting other economic agents; which includes the option of 
project withdrawal. Minimized compensation relates to projects with impacts as minimal as 
possible on BES.   
(b) In the case of self-realized mitigation, either the firm buys land assets ecologically 
equivalent to what has been lost in its newly developed areas (additional costs relate to the 
price of land assets bought), or it needs to restore acquired land assets so as to meet ecological 
equivalency criteria.  
(c) Lastly, externalized mitigation relates to the demand for restored land assets. The 
company may acquire ecologically equivalent areas restored by other organizations, or it can 
purchase BES units from a ‘mitigation company’ (business specialized in selling BES units) 
according the number of units required for mitigating its BES loss.  
This third option is without doubt the most uncertain for both suppliers and demanders 
of BES units, as it is subject to the laws of the market. The latter can be less attractive than 
expected, for instance because firms (perceive) find it less costly to either perform avoided or 
minimized mitigation or self-realized mitigation (Trommetter et al., 2008).  
Various mitigation mechanisms have been implemented worldwide, notably Wetland 
Mitigation Banks in the USA (Clean Water Act of 1972) and the Bush Broker Program in 
Australia. Provided criteria of ecological efficacy are at their core, these may be very effective 
at integrating conservation objectives within regional planning. First, they put a price on BES 
destruction. This sends very important signals to businesses and may encourage them to 
maximize avoided or minimized mitigation at the project design stage (preventive approach), 
for instance via the systematization of tunnels and viaducts to secure ecological continuities. 
Secondly, land areas with high ecological value may become much more attractive than under 
‘normal’ circumstances. Thirdly, economies of scale push businesses to restore habitats over 
large areas and sell BES units associated with these lands. Mitigation markets thus allow the 
private sector to complement the public sector’s efforts for biodiversity conservation.  
Combining ecosystem services to mitigation mechanisms may become a standard for 
environmental policy throughout the European Union. This will not be without legal 
problems, notably with respect to the management and ownership of mitigation sites, as well 
as the associated liabilities and market regulation mechanisms. Roach (2006) stresses the 
importance of ecological equivalencies because of the difficulties and limitations of the 
economic evaluation of ecological damages. According to Perrings et al. (2009), the 
construction of the ratio of restored areas to degraded ones is relatively empirical in reality. 
From 1993 to 2000, some 95 km2 of wetlands have been cleared in the USA in exchanged for 
165 km2 of restored ones (ratio largely superior to 1). Though public authorities usually 
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decide the equivalence between hectares developed and hectares restored, this might reflect 
the need to ensure its acceptability from the perspective of key stakeholders.  
Mitigating business impacts on BES is not without its controversies (Trommetter, et 
al., 2008). Ideally, the question should be “what are the most optimal combinations of 
options, from an economic, a social and an ecological standpoint, to mitigate development 
projects within an ecosystem?” For firms however, the aim is, most likely, to find the best 
option(s) to minimize costs given ecological objectives defined by the state or other relevant 
authority (cost-efficiency approach). Several authors further highlight the limitations and 
difficulties relating to the implementation of mitigation contracts between businesses (e.g. 
Hallwood, 2006): (a) lack of clarity with regards to the methods and indicators used to 
measure ecological performance may prevent the rigorous assessment of net BES loss or gain 
(Fennessy et al., 2007); (b) mitigation costs can be prohibitive for the mitigation business 
when compared to the price of BES units on the market; (c) unexpected or unimplemented 
penalties or fines; and (d) very high transactions costs can have negative influence on social 
wellbeing (Goldman 2007), hence the need to simplify administrative processes. 
Though they are more than necessary for the internalization of certain biodiversity 
externalities, impact mitigation mechanisms fall short of the goal of fully integrating 
biodiversity into business strategies and practices. Their key, underlying shortcoming lies in 
the conceptual framework within which they tend to restrict business perceptions of its 
interactions with living systems. As argued by Raffini and Robertson (2005), “the commodity 
in wetland banking is not healthy wetlands or clean water. Rather, it is the less concrete 
service of regulatory relief. Developers and polluters have no utility in clean water or healthy 
wetlands; what they want is a rapid permit process and the avoidance of liability for 
mitigation site failure”. Besides, the additional costs resulting from mitigation measures may 
not necessarily be integrated into core business routines and processes so as to foster 
collective innovation.  
 
 
3 – THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN BUSINESS AND BIODIVERSITY: RETHINKING BUSINESS 
STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES 
 
 
3.1 Introducing the Orée – IFB Working Group  
 
Various organizations have attempted to help companies address biodiversity issues 
through risk analysis and stakeholder management, so as to gain competitive advantage and / 
or avoid costs as the underlying rationale (Houdet 2008; MA 2005; Tucker 2006). Risk 
analysis, the assessment of the uncertainty, frequency or probability of an event and its 
severity, is central to social controversy and economic activity. While one of its elements is 
fairly objective, that is to say the probability and the severity of damage, it also contains a 
subjective, cultural element, that is to say the perception and acceptability of risk (Chevassus-
au-Louis 2007). Several studies have classified biodiversity risks (ISIS 2004; Mulder 2007; 
Tucker 2006; Waager et al., 2008), essentially in terms of regulations (liability, taxation), 
industrial standards and norms, stakeholders’ pressures and expectations, corporate image or 
reputation, evolution of customers’ needs and wants (market risk), operations management 
(accidents, availability and costs of resources) and cost of capital (financing, insurance and 
investment risks; UNEP FI 2008). A step-by-step, procedural methodology for identifying 
business risks and opportunities with respect to ecosystem change has been recently 
developed by the WBCSD, the Meridian Institute and the WRI (Hanson et al., 2008). It can be 
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used by any company and focuses on assessing business’s dependence and impacts on priority 
ecosystem services so as to develop strategies. 
 The Orée – Institut Français de la Biodiversité Working Group (WG) belongs within 
the scope of the aforementioned Business & Biodiversity Initiative and seeks to be 
complementary to these approaches. It ambition is that its work will go beyond the search for 
a compromise between conservation and the economy to incorporate biodiversity fully into 
business strategies, using the language of business itself, that of costs and revenues (Houdet, 
2008). Ways must be found through which biodiversity can drive development while 
economic activity can be a means to conserving or increasing biodiversity. This may seem 
utopian, but we posit that it is an appropriate framework for strategic thinking. To make the 
WG’s approach clear to its business members, we first worked on the assessment of the 
dependence of the economy on biodiversity, in a ‘rough and ready’ way, across the various 
industries as defined by the French national accounting system. Selected groups of criteria 
comprised technology, raw materials, impacts and sales, with results showing that living 
systems considerably shape business activity, directly or / and indirectly, irrespective of the 
industry.  
Business members were then asked to engage in the same exercise themselves, using 
the Business and Biodiversity Interdependence Indicator (BBII) which was developed in 2006 
by the WG5. With its cross-sector approach, the BBII can be applied to any semi-finished or 
finished goods or to any company’s operations, which may be multiple and diversified, as in 
the case of a large multinational. The analysis chart includes twenty-three criteria (Houdet 
2008; 2008b): those linked to business strategies, those linked to impacts and impact 
mitigation, those linked to current markets and those directly linked to biodiversity 
(ecosystem services, biotechnologies, renewable and non-renewable resources, management 
of ecosystem health, variability and complexity). For each criterion the analysis offers four 
options. The business has to select one of these options by checking a box: (1) not concerned 
by this criterion, (2) slightly concerned by this criterion, (3) moderately concerned by this 
criterion, (4) strongly concerned by this criterion. Asking for an explanation of the choice for 
each criterion was meant to give a qualitative sense of each company’s understanding of its 
interdependence with biodiversity.  
The outcome of this work is compiled within a book and presented in the form of self-
assessments in which 24 organizations of various industries (retailers, water utilities and 
mining companies among others) convey their own perception of their interactions with living 
systems (Houdet 2008). This concluded Phase 1 of Orée - IFB WG: it gave us legitimacy and 
support for further work with respect to the full integration of biodiversity into business 
strategies.  
 
3.2 A typology of business perception and behavior with respect to biodiversity  
 
Numerous articles bearing on businesses’ attitude to environmental issues have been 
published. They focus on typologies of business behavior (Hart 1995; Martinet and Reynaud, 
2000; Persais 1998; Capron and Quairel-Lanoizelée, 2007). For instance, Jolly (1993), on the 
basis of the works of Carroll (1979), has proposed a typology of environmental strategies by 
highlighting different types of business behavior: (a) eco-defensive behaviors, which focus on 
immediate economic returns and consider environmental investments exclusively as costs ; 
(b) eco-compliance behaviors, which seek to do no more than satisfying regulatory norms; 
and (c) eco-sensible behaviors, which seek to go beyond legal requirements, environmental 
concerns considered as key to the viability of the firm. Bellini (2003) further argues that 
                                                 
5 The BBII is a composite indicator. For a complete list of criteria, please refer to Houdet (2008).  
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business behavior regarding environmental issues is shaped by two types of decision-making 
logic within the firm : (1) an additive logic, where the firm does not question its decision-
making process (eco-defensive and eco-compliance behaviors) which is opposed to (2) a 
systemic logic, for which taking into account environmental dimensions of a business activity 
deeply modifies the structure and dynamics of the decision-making process (“eco-sensible” 
behaviors).  
Business perceptions, attitudes, behaviors and strategies regarding biodiversity are 
progressively changing, as illustrated by the European Platform Biodiversity Research 
Strategy (EPBRS) meeting and e-conference on ‘Biodiversity and Industry’ in October - 
November 2008 (Grant et al., 2008). Building upon the results of Phase 1 of Orée – IFB WG, 
biodiversity can no longer be exclusively associated with an external constraint on business 
activity (impact mitigation approach). The interactions between living systems give rise to 
diverse sets of ecosystem functions, services and benefits, such as raw materials and 
biotechnologies used directly by firms. Therefore, biodiversity is also a source of revenues 
and expenses. Using the matrix of the dynamics of compromise adapted from Métrot (2005) 
and the business self-assessments of their interdependence with biodiversity published in 
Houdet (2008), we propose four types of business perception and behavior with respect to 
biodiversity issues: 
• Stonewalling policy (status quo): most firms do not consider themselves concerned by 
biodiversity loss, even they though readily acknowledge their use of raw materials and 
technologies derived from BES. Taking biodiversity into account from this perspective would 
involve, at best, the use of charters or codes of conduct without training or audit system. At 
best, they might sponsor projects dedicated to biodiversity conservation, as a form of 
biodiversity offset not linked to the business activity.  
• Reactive policy: biodiversity is acknowledged as a potential risk and is considered as 
an external constraint. Stakeholder management is focused on justifying current business 
practices, including “business-as-usual” projects or ventures, as well as on avoiding damages 
to corporate or brand image. The focus is on procedural measures, certification (e.g. a few, 
often relatively indirect or imprecise, biodiversity “performance” indicators included in 
environmental management systems and reporting) and public relations (greenwashing). 
Firms seek to avoid mitigation measures (or minimize their costs if unavoidable) by justifying 
the social and economic benefits of their project. At best, unavoidable mitigation measures 
have elusive or intangible BES targets and are hence mostly ecologically ineffective: a release 
from legal responsibility is what is actively sought. 
• Pro-active policy: biodiversity is identified as a tangible business risk which 
necessitates specific policies and / or action plans. It may lead to changes in business 
perception, for instance considering that costs linked to taking biodiversity into account are 
normal, recurring costs to be incorporated within the standard decision-making framework of 
the firm. The focus is on compliance with norms or regulations (e.g. mitigation measures duly 
performed), sometimes going beyond requirements but without questioning the business plan.  
• Win – win policy: firms see biodiversity as a whole, not only some of its readily 
valuable or used components, as true business opportunities and are ready to rethink and / or 
redesign their production, organizational and decision-making processes. This is akin to 
Jolly’s systemic logic approach mentioned previously. For instance, some businesses may use 
biological and / or ecosystem heterogeneity and / or diversity as a standard for technological 
and organizational innovation: e.g. treating polluted water through diversified artificial 
wetlands rich in indigenous biodiversity (Houdet 2008). This means choosing to make use of 
the diversity of living systems so as to produce goods and services, including ES benefiting 
other economic agents (e.g. the multi-functionality of European agriculture may lead farmers 
to ‘produce’ ES, or, more precisely, be paid for specific (in)actions linked to specified BES 
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outcomes). This form of business behavior necessitates public support policies (institutional 
innovation) for the diffusion of the required technological and organizational innovation, as 
well as new accounting and reporting information systems with respect to the interactions 
between firms and BES (Houdet 2008). 
This last component of our proposed typology of business perception and behavior 
with respect to biodiversity sets the scene for the analysis of new business strategies with 
respect to living systems, first at the level of business practices linked to payments for 
ecosystem services (sub-sections 3.4 and 3.5) and, secondly, at that of standards of 
production, management, corporate performance assessment and / or innovation (sub-section 
3.6).   
 
 
3.3 Payments for Ecosystem Services: business opportunities  
 
As previously argued, mitigation measures may lead to positive changes in ecosystem 
services which could be remunerated. This may be correlated to relatively recent research and 
schemes with respect to remunerating economic agents for specific practices linked to the 
delivery of specific ecosystem services, including those that contribute directly to another 
business activity (Barbault 2006; Perrot-Maître 2006) and those which are linked to the 
provision of public goods (biodiversity conservation, CO2 sequestration). Provided ecosystem 
services are identified and their benefits to economic agents evaluated, the focus would be on 
measuring their maintenance costs and the associated financing mechanisms; the latter 
including at least three (potentially complementary) options: (a) payments by public 
authorities, (b) payments by beneficiaries of BES and (c) payments by consumers of final 
goods and services produced in a “biodiversity-friendly” way (Trommetter et al., 2008).  
Direct compensation payments have been proposed with respect to in-situ agro-
biodiversity conservation (Boody et al., 2005; Hackl 2007; Pascual and Perrings, 2007; 
Perrings et al., 2009). When a farmer shifts to non-productive land uses which are favorable 
to biodiversity, several options do exist for financing there changes:  
1. State intervention, through subsidies, is justified on the ground that BES are 
undersupplied public goods. This is particularly relevant within the context of the multi-
functionality of European agriculture and the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and 
somewhat akin to conservation easements in the USA where the focus is on preventing 
economic agents from doing something (e.g. change in land use) through contractual 
agreements (Gustanski and Squires, 2000; Merenlender et al., 2004).  
2. A complementary mechanism may see consumers paying a premium for goods and 
services which are produced according to practices or standards which ‘protect or restore 
BES’, as (supposedly) in the case of organic farming and eco-tourism. In such a context, BES 
‘maintenance’ (supply) costs are internalized into the prices of goods and services, though it 
remains unclear under which institutional conditions business practices favourable to 
biodiversity may or may not be more costly than practices homogenizing it (including 
labelling and certification schemes; Hodge 2007; Angeon and Caron 2008)6.  
3. Similarly, certain business transactions between firms can be understood as 
payments for ecosystem services: firms may undertake practices (action or inaction) which 
deliver specific (levels of) ecosystem services and be paid by beneficiaries. In the case of 
Vittel (a mineral water firm in France; Déprés et al., 2008; Perrot-Maître 2006), the company 
pays farmers for practices which go beyond legal requirements in terms of water quality, as 
                                                 
6 When comparing the evolution of labor costs with input costs, organic farming could be economically more 
efficient under certain conditions (Roger-Estrade et al., 2008).   
 13
excessive nitrate concentrations due to fertilizer use could lead to the (temporal) closure of its 
water bottling plant. This approach is allegedly valid up to the point it becomes more 
expensive for the firm than an ‘artificial’ alternative which would substitute the ecosystem 
service in question (e.g. water treatment plant in the case of Vittel to capture nitrate particles) 
and, most likely, homogenize biodiversity simultaneously (e.g. intensification of farming 
practices within watersheds, notably the increased use of fertilizers and / or the shift to 
monocultures). 
The generalization of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) seems highly 
appealing. While research into systems (Odum 1983; 1996) and industrial ecology (Erkman 
1997; Shrivastava 1994) has shown that the development of firms is intrinsically linked to the 
evolution of the ecosystems to which they belong, its analysis of interactions between firms 
and ecosystems has almost exclusively focused on resource and energy consumption (and 
their related impacts on ecosystems), thus leaving most business – biodiversity interactions 
out of the picture. Combining7 strategies for mitigating BES loss (Polluter or Impacter Pays 
Principle - OCDE 1975; SLWRMC 1999) and remunerating BES supply (Beneficiary Pays 
Principle - Aretino et al., 2001; Hackl et al., 2007; Pascual and Perrings, 2007; linked to some 
extent to the Victim Pays Principle - Siebert 1992) opens the door to new forms of arbitrage 
with respect to land use and development, as well as core business processes and practices. 
This approach sees BES provision becoming an integral part of the business plan of the firm, 
first as a strategic core variable among others for decision-making and management (beyond 
impact mitigation) and, perhaps more importantly, as a source of (a) new assets and liabilities 
(BES trading rights and / or contractual agreements), (b) new skills or competencies (e.g. 
biodiversity skills in the Finnish forest industry; Wolf and Primmer, 2006), as well as (c) 
technological (e.g. using living systems as ecosystem engineers; Byers et al., 2006; Hastings 
et al., 2006) and organizational innovations. The development of markets for BES may hence 
lead to major changes in business methods, routines, practices, intra-organizational norms and 
organization of the workplace.  
Yet, managing ecosystems for specific ecosystem services, especially those which 
generate higher returns on investment, may lead to unforeseen ecosystem change, degradation 
or even collapse. For instance, managing biomass and productivity of tree plantations to 
maximize CO2 sequestration leads to diminished stream flows, increased soil salinization and 
acidification (Jackson et al., 2002). In a Calluna vulgaris-dominated moorland invaded by 
bracken (Pteridium aquilinum), a species which sequestrates nutrients, Marrs et al. (2006) 
showed a potential dilemma between controlling a mid-successional invasive species for 
conservation policy objectives, and the negative effect of increasing environmental costs in 
terms of carbon accounting required, the potential input of nutrients to aquatic systems, and 
long-term nutrient loss. Though recent efforts have focused on designing institutional 
mechanisms targeting various ES (CO2 storage essentially) while conserving biodiversity 
(REDD proposals; Gibbs et al., 2007; Miles and Kapos, 2008; Mollicone et al., 2007; 
Swingland 2002), one may argue that such situations (i.e. relatively unexploited tropical 
forests) are more an exception than the rule. The key challenge lies in developing markets for 
BES in areas where business activities are diverse and intensive.  
 
 
3.4 Payments for Ecosystem Services: delineating and enforcing property rights 
 
                                                 
7 Iftikhar et al. (2007) provide some preliminary thoughts on inter-linkages among and between Compensation 
and Rewards for Ecosystem Services (CRES) and human well-being, with a special focus on its implications for 
poor communities.  
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 Perrings et al. (2009) discuss various requirements for an efficient sharing of BES 
advantages: “(1) to clarify the level of excludability and rivalry of such ES by beneficiaries 
and providers; (2) a sufficient demand or willingness to pay for such services by the 
beneficiaries; (3) to delineate and enforce property rights surrounding land use and 
ecosystem services; (4) investment in social capital to foster collective action and cohesion 
between the providers and beneficiaries of ecosystem services.” To those may be added 
policy challenges relating to defining ecosystem boundaries as well as to ES spatial and 
temporal relationships across different scales (though cross-scale evaluations may be 
unreliable over time given the propensity of ecosystems to behave like complex adaptive 
systems; Holling and Gunderson, 2002). Several ecosystems may exist within a larger one and 
their boundaries may expand and contract over time in response to ecosystem changes, 
including anthropogenic influences. Nevertheless, the precise tracing - if ever possible - of ES 
from their source(s), which may be discrete, ambient or variable, to their ultimate user(s) 
(point, diffuse, or spotty) is likely to be required, and may further necessitate identifying 
service provision timing, delivery channels, distance delivery, and delivery timing (Ruhl et 
al., 2007).  
For businesses to fully embrace markets for BES, the aforementioned uncertainties 
will need to be resolved, especially with respect to defining clear regimes of property rights 
over BES, as the basis for contractual agreements between sellers and buyers. Property rights 
cannot be reduced to private property or state property. In effect, private property itself cannot 
guarantee the viability of renewable resources (Ostrom et al., 2002). It is liable to lead to their 
wanton destruction, especially if financial capital is mobile (Weber 2002). Besides, to address 
the management of BES in terms of land rights can lead to confusion between ownership of 
the land itself and of the rights to BES their users derive from it. A variety of property rights 
exist, from the traditional (private and public property rights) to the more complex (rights of 
access and use). We may hence speak of modes of appropriation, of which land ownership is 
only one form and private property a very special case. Insofar as rights of access and use are 
independent of property rights on goods (resources), using markets for trading property rights 
may be highly flexible and adaptable, transaction costs being reduced by trading certain 
elements of property without laying a hand on property itself. As argued by Weber (2002), 
“patents, which are temporary monopolies on access and use, do not constitute ‘ownership 
rights’. You cannot own genes, but only acquire a monopoly on the access and use of them. 
Living systems thus cannot be ‘appropriated’, but markets can be developed for the trading of 
rights of access and use.”  
 As the previous arguments suggest, the scientific issues around BES are in fact also 
economic, social and political issues. As argued by Weber (1996), “managing biodiversity 
means focusing primarily on the management of interactions among humans with respect to 
nature, first at the level of regulation and control of access to resources, then at the level of 
the decision-making process, whether imposed from elsewhere or negotiated and 
contractual”. For instance, according to Freyfogle (2006), “private property is a form of 
power over people not land”. This leads to equity concerns with respect to the emergence of 
markets for BES. Weber (2002) further argues that the growth of markets of property rights is 
not a reason to be optimistic about opportunities for the poor to regain control of their lives. If 
markets of property rights were to expand to cover the management of BES, on the current 
model of intellectual property rights, this would have a major impact in so-called ‘developing’ 
countries. Depending on how they would be regulated, these markets could either strengthen 
local communities or, much more probably, marginalize them further through the hoarding of 
rights by those in power, whether politicians, customary chiefs or private organisations. 
Recognising that very varied regimes of appropriation do exist, by guaranteeing rights to 
temporary or permanent access and use, is one of the surest ways to fight poverty (Weber 
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2002). It is a prerequisite for socially equitable local governance models, by giving local 
communities the opportunity to regain possession of their present and engage themselves in 
the future.  
 Despite these challenges and risks, approaches attempting to internalize BES 
externalities - both positive and negative - through market mechanisms provide a new 
framework for the framing of business strategy regarding living systems. While these present 
opportunities to be sized (or ‘created’) by proactive and win-win members of the business 
community (see aforementioned typology of business behaviour), public authorities and 
stakeholders should help ensure that the underlying objective clearly remains to combine 
economic, ecological and social efficacy. From this perspective, we would argue that 
compensating, subsidizing or paying for specific BES delivery is unlikely to cover the 
complete spectrum of interactions between businesses and the diversity of living systems, 
hence the need for complementary tools and approaches ensuring dynamics of co-viability 
between them. As aforementioned, the last subsection of the paper discusses the need to 
revisit business standards. 
   
 
3.5 Production, management, corporate performance assessment and innovation 
standards promoting the diversity, heterogeneity and variability of living systems  
 
 According to Arthur (1989), the word ‘standard’ has two meanings: that of 
conventions or code of practice and that of the technology or method or code that comes to 
dominate. Various taxonomies exist to classify standards, for instance by distinguishing them 
on the basis (a) that they pertain to ‘thresholds’, ‘compatibility issues’ or ‘definitions / 
methodologies’ (David 1987) or (b) that they apply to ‘things’ (e.g. metric system), ‘things 
one does’ (e.g. quality improvement) or ‘things one has’ (e.g. carrier plans) (Brunsson and 
Jacobson, 2000). By further discussing the nature of interactions between businesses and 
biodiversity, the last part of this article will attempt to propose preliminary conceptual 
foundations of new business standards needed to reverse current biodiversity trends.  
 First, it is crucial to assess the nature of interaction dynamics between businesses and 
living systems. Norgaard (1985) argues that we are both witnesses and participants in the co-
evolution of ecosystems and socio-economic systems. One example of this coevolution is the 
reciprocal influences between agricultural pests, pesticides, the regulation of pesticide use and 
the cultural assessment of their use: knowledge, values, types of organisation, technology and 
ecosystems are all in continuous interaction (Norgaard 1984; 1994). Businesses are not 
intrinsically hostile to living systems, in fact far from it. Some species, which provide direct 
monetary or cultural benefits, have been selected by humans for millennia, and thus can be 
said to have co-evolved with them: we need only mention the growing of crops or the 
breeding of farm animals8. Concerned organisms have adapted to business selective pressures 
and in turn affect their strategies and modes of production. The overt or unconscious 
motivation for these selective dynamics of coevolution - which has led to the competitive 
exclusion of other living systems over increasingly wide areas - seems to be the ‘necessary’ 
control over uncertainties associated with ecosystems in order to produce goods and services 
at minimal private costs and meet consumers’ demands. Businesses and all their stakeholders, 
including consumers and governments, are thus responsible for globalizing the 
homogenisation of living systems. Contemporary technological, organisational and 
institutional innovation is elevating uniformity to the status of a universal model, thus 
inexorably reducing the variability, diversity and complexity of living systems (Barbault 
                                                 
8 Notwithstanding recent massive business investments linked to biotechnologies. 
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1994; Weber 1996). As a result, randomness-generating mechanisms (‘Biological roulettes’ 
according to Pavé 2007), which operate at all levels - from biological systems to ecological 
ones, are rejected, over-simplified and even obliterated outright by businesses: this is a key 
driver of ongoing biodiversity loss. 
If diversity, variability and adaptive change are the true insurance policies for the 
success of life on Earth (Barbault 2006; Pavé 2007) and for the (free of charge) ecosystem 
services which underpin our economies (Braat and ten Brick, 2008; MA 2005) and, hence, 
business activities (perceptions of businesses which used the BBII; Houdet 2008), what are 
the risks associated with such business choices and practices? Pavé (2007) underlines the 
importance of ‘chance’ in the functioning and evolution of living systems. ‘Biological 
roulettes’ guarantee the diversity of living systems and their evolutionary capacity in 
uncertain, changing environments. In other words, randomness-generating mechanisms are 
necessary for the survival and evolution of living systems, including that of humans in all our 
cultural, linguistic and organisational diversity, as well as for our policy and development 
choices, economic models and industrial systems. From this perspective, business models 
based on biological uniformity can have major consequences on business themselves. This 
may involve ecosystem collapse after certain (possibly interacting) thresholds are crossed 
(e.g. impacts of irrigation practices on dryland salinity and farming activities in Australia, 
bankruptcies linked to collapsed fisheries due to single-stock approach to fishery 
management, water bottlers forced to relocate their operations because of pollution – Déprés 
et al., 2008); hence past and current research undertaken with respect to the resilience of  
socio-ecological systems (Abel et al., 2006; Carpenter et al., 2002; Walker and Meyers, 
2004). Accordingly, can we rethink the nature of interactions between businesses and the 
diversity of living systems? What co-evolutionary logic could be chosen to develop 
mutualistic evolutionary dynamics between biodiversity and networks of firms? This amounts 
to asking simultaneously how can profits be used to diversify living systems, and how can 
biodiversity become a source of increased profits.  
We thus propose to overturn the uniformity model and build a new model of 
development based on the growth and globalisation of the diversity and heterogeneity of 
living systems. This amounts to enhancing, at the heart of technological, organisational and 
institutional innovation, the biological roulettes which underpin the evolutionary dynamics of 
human beings and the living systems which they depend on and form part of within the 
biosphere. In other words, the challenge is to develop standards relating to business activities 
which promote or reward the use of the variability and diversity of living systems so as to 
maintain or restore the widest possible range of ecosystem services (inclusive of biodiversity 
itself) used at different time and spatial scales; as insurance policies for the viable 
management of marine and terrestrial ecosystems, whether urban, agricultural, rural or wild. 
This opens the door to significant research and development with respect to both pre-existing 
and new standards involving a considerable array of business issues, notably from plant and 
product design, technologies (e.g. modes of agricultural production and pollution treatment), 
information systems (e.g. product labelling, management accounting systems) to ecological 
thresholds linked to ecosystem use and management. 
From the perspective of production processes for instance, the recommended approach 
would seek to understand ecosystem functioning, maintain or increase its potential and draw 
upon its features to provide goods and services to consumers. This means ‘playing with’ 
natural variability, not suppressing it, and developing adaptive strategies for both natural and 
economic variability, instead of pursuing optimal solutions (Weber 1996; 2009). For instance, 
recent experiments in China (Zhu et al., 2000) show that mixtures of rice varieties resistant to 
the most threatening pathogens did form a barrier to the spread of destructive fungus, with a 
resulting harvest 89% more successful than rice monoculture. Similarly, investing in multi-
 17
cropping models, common place in so-called developing countries, is gaining ground in 
western ones (e.g. agro-forestry and silvo-pastoralism; Dupraz and Liagre, 2008; Mosquera-
Losada et al., 2005). This provides some insights of the kind of technological innovation 
needed as an underling scheme for markets for BES: firms in all economic sectors could 
develop ecological engineering expertise for the restoration of ecosystems on a hitherto 
unparalleled scale. Moreover, from the perspective of corporate performance assessment, this 
calls for a new corporate accounting and reporting standards institutionalizing an enlarged 
business responsibility towards biodiversity and ecosystem services useful to stakeholders. 
This means adopting an ecosystem-based interpretation of value-added creation through 
industrial processes and economic dynamics, going beyond national and jurisdictional 
boundaries to focus directly on the access, use and modes of appropriation of BES.  
To that end, means must be found so that costs of change are bearable for firms. Costs 
and benefits of reducing negative externalities with respect to BES are often modelled for 
unchanged technology or modes of production (link with aforementioned asset specificity 
issues)9. We argue that the institutional (both incentives and disincentives) frameworks 
‘governing’ markets of BES and associated business standards should be based on a co-
viability logic between businesses and the diversity of living systems, the latter including 
human communities (Houdet 2008). A growing number of studies are proposing viability or 
co-viability models (Viability Theory; Aubin 1992), especially for fisheries (Béné et al., 2001; 
Doyen et al., 2008; Martinet et al., 2007), agro-systems (Tichit et al., 2007) and water bodies 
(Martin 2004). They reveal a profound shift towards a dynamic, viable approach to ecosystem 
management, and suggest possible pathways for modelling co-viability dynamics between 
businesses and biodiversity. 
 
 
4- CONCLUSION 
 
Biodiversity is usually understood as a new, additional form of external environmental 
constraint on business activity within the context of the environment – competitiveness 
debate. It is linked essentially to regulatory frameworks overseeing where and how businesses 
can operate, chiefly through the appraisal of new industrial projects. Businesses make use of 
cost-benefit analyses so as to capture the marginal economic value of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services for trade-offs purposes: this allows them and their stakeholders to account 
for BES loss or gain from an economic perspective. Yet, despite numerous efforts, BES may 
not easily be translated into a monetary proxy for market internalization, hence some 
stakeholders arguing that the total economic value of biodiversity, though useful, is not 
sufficient for arbitrage. Accordingly, conventional business strategy amounts essentially at 
identifying, assessing, monitoring and mitigating the impacts of business activities on 
biodiversity, especially on its components protected by law or those important to legitimate 
stakeholders. For preexisting business activities on the one hand, this would involve at best a 
cost-effectiveness approach with respect to negotiated or mandatory ecological goals linked to 
changes in business practices. For new business projects on the other hand, mitigation 
mechanisms based on a “no net loss” five-stage approach are actively being promoted 
worldwide, studies highlighting the importance of ecological equivalencies given the 
difficulties associated with the economic valuation of damages.  
Though they are more than necessary for the internalization of certain biodiversity 
externalities, impact mitigation mechanisms fall short of the goal of fully integrating 
biodiversity into business strategies and practices: they restrict business perceptions of its 
                                                 
9 With the exception of GHG emissions for which research is undertaken so as to both reduce them and help 
businesses adapt to ecosystem change. 
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interactions with living systems to the management of their negative impacts on BES. 
Nonetheless, business attitudes, behaviors and strategies regarding biodiversity are 
progressively changing. Previous work on the Business and Biodiversity Interdependence 
Indicator (BBII) have shown that firms’ perceptions of their interdependences with 
biodiversity are highly diverse, referring to technologies, sales and the management of supply 
chains among other issues. This suggests the emergence of business strategies and practices 
which could go beyond impact mitigation and the search of a compromise between 
development and conservation. Combining strategies for mitigating BES loss (Polluter Pays 
Principle) and remunerating BES supply (Beneficiary Pays Principle) opens the door to new 
forms of arbitrage with respect to land use and development, as well as core business 
processes. This approach may see BES maintenance or provision becoming an integral part of 
the business plan of the firm, as a core variable among others for decision-making and 
management and as a source of new assets, liabilities, skills, technological and organizational 
innovations. Provided that property rights regarding BES are clearly delineated and enforced, 
the development of markets for BES may lead to major changes in business methods, 
routines, intra-organizational norms and organization of the workplace. Yet, compensating, 
subsidizing or paying for specific BES delivery is unlikely to cover the complete spectrum of 
interactions between businesses and the diversity of living systems. Ecological and social 
risks associated with managing ecosystems exclusively for a single ecosystem service need to 
be taken systematically into account when designing markets for BES. This calls for 
complementary approaches and tools ensuring dynamics of co-viability between firms and 
biodiversity. We thus underline the need for management, production, innovation and 
corporate performance assessment standards designed to promote or reward the use of the 
diversity, heterogeneity and variability of living systems by firms, so as to maintain or restore 
the widest possible range of ecosystem services - inclusive of biodiversity itself - used by all 
stakeholders at variable time and spatial scales. 
 
  
 19
5- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The authors would like to thank the members of the Orée - IFB Working Group 
“Integrating biodiversity into business strategies” and especially CREED - Veolia 
Environnement for funding the research project (CIFRE fellowship – PhD thesis). 
 
 
6- REFERENCES 
 
Abel, N., Cumming, D.H.M., Anderies, J.M., 2006. Collapse and reorganization in 
social-ecological systems: questions, some ideas, and policy implications. Ecology and 
Society 11 (1), 26p. Accessed in June 2009 on  
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art17/. 
Aubin, J.P., 1992. Viability theory. Birkhaüser. 
Angeon, V., Caron, A., 2008. Le rôle de la proximité dans l’émergence et l’adoption 
de pratiques de gestion durable de la foret: l'exemple de deux territoires forestiers auvergnats, 
in: Colloque international "La problématique du développement durable vingt ans après : 
nouvelles lectures théoriques, innovations méthodologiques et domaines d'extension", Lille. 
Aretino, B., Holland, P., Matysek, A., Peterson, D., 2001. Cost sharing for biodiversity 
conservation: a conceptual framework. Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper, 
AusInfo, Canberra. 
Arthur, W.B., 1989. Competing technologies, increasing returns and lock-in by 
historical events. The Economic Journal 99 (394), 116-31. 
Azqueta, D., Sotelsek, D., 2007. Valuing nature: from environmental impacts to 
natural capital. Ecological Economics, 63, 22-30. 
Bacqué, M.H., 2005. L’intraduisible notion d’empowerment vu au fil des politiques 
urbaines américaines. Territoires (Septembre), 32-35. 
Barbault, R., 1994. Des baleines, des bactéries et des hommes. Odile Jacob, Paris. 
Barbault, R., 2006. Un éléphant dans un jeu de quilles. L’homme dans la biodiversité. 
Seuil, Paris. 
Barbier, E.B., 1989. Economics, natural-resource scarcity and development. Earthscan 
Publications, London. 
Bazin, D., 2009. What exactly is corporate responsibility towards nature? Ecological 
responsibility or management of nature? A pluri-disciplinary standpoint. Ecological 
Economics 68, 634-642. 
Bellini, B., 2003. Un nouvel enjeu stratégique pour l’entreprise: la prise en compte de 
la protection de l’environnement dans son management. Etat des lieux et 
perspectives Communication à la Journée Développement Durable de l’AIMS, 15 mai 2003, 
Angers. 
Béné, E., Doyen, L., Gabay, D., 2001. A viability analysis for a bio-economic model. 
Ecological Economics 36, 385-396. 
Boiral, O., Jolly, D., 1992. Stratégie, compétitivité et écologie. Revue française de 
gestion 89, 80-85. 
Boiral, O., 2005. Concilier environnement et compétitivité, ou la quête de l’éco-
efficience. Revue Française de Gestion 158, 163-186. 
Boisvert, V., Caron, A., 2007. Valorisation économique des ressources et nouveaux 
marchés, in: Aubertin, C., Pinton, F., Boisvert, V. (Eds.), Les marchés de la biodiversité, IRD 
éditions, Paris, 195-217. 
 20
Bonnieux, F., 1998. Principe, mise en œuvre et limites de la méthode d’évaluation 
contingente. Économie Publique 1 (1). Accessed in February 2008 on 
http://economiepublique.revues.org/document1828.html. 
Boody, G., Vondracek, B., Andow, D.A., Krinke, M., Westra, J., Zimmerman, J., 
Welle, P., 2005. Multifunctional Agriculture in the United States. BioScience 55 (1), 27-38. 
Boyd, G., McCelland, J.D., 1999. The impact of environmental constraints on 
productivity improvement in integrated paper plants. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 38, 121-142. 
Braat, L., ten Brink, P. (Eds.), 2008. The cost of policy inaction: the case of not 
meeting the 2010 biodiversity target. Study for the European Commission, DG Environment 
under contract: ENV.G.1/ETU/2007/0044 (Official Journal reference: 2007 / S 95 – 116033). 
Brunsson, N., Jacobsson, B., 2000. A world of standards. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 2009. Business, Biodiversity Offsets 
and BBOP: An Overview. BBOP, Washington, D.C. 
Byers, J.E., Cuddington, K., Jones, C.G., Talley, T.S., Hastings, A., Lambrinos, 
Crooks, J.A., Wilson, W.G., 2006. Using ecosystem engineers to restore ecological systems. 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution 21 (9), 493-500. 
Capron, M., Quairel-Lanoizelée, F., 2007. La responsabilité sociale d'entreprise. 
Collection Repères 477, Paris. 
Carpenter, S.R., Brock, W.A., Ludwig, D., 2002. Collapse, learning and renewal, in: 
Gunderson, L.H., Holling, C.S. (Eds.), Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and 
natural systems. Island Press, Washington D.C., 173-193. 
Carroll, A.B., 1979. A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social 
performance. The Academy of Management Review  4 (1), 497-505.  
Chevassus-au-Louis, B., 2007. L’analyse des risques. L’expert, le décideur et le 
citoyen. Editions Quae - Sciences en question, Versailles.  
Chevassus-au-Louis, B., Salles, J.-M., Bielsa, S., Richard, D., Martin, G., Pujol, J.-L., 
2009. Approche économique de la biodiversité et des services liés aux ecosystems: 
contribution à la décision publique. Rapport du CAS, Paris. 
Cho, C.H., Patten, D.M., 2006 The role of environmental disclosures as tools of 
legitimacy: A research note. Accounting, Organizations and Society 32 (7-8), 639-647. 
Coase, R., 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3(1), 1-
44. 
Cormier, D., Magnan, M., Morard, B., 1993. The impact of corporate pollution on 
market valuation: some empirical evidence.  Ecological Economics 8, 135-155. 
Costanza, R., d’Arge, R., de Groot, R., Farber, S., Grasso, M., Hannon, B., Limburg, 
K., Naeem, S., O’Neill, R.V., Paruelo, J., Raskin, R.G., Sutton, P., van der Belt, M., 1997. 
The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital. Nature 387 (6630), 253-260. 
Costanza, R., Fisher, B., Mulder, K., Liu, S., Christopher, T., 2007. Biodiversity and 
ecosystem services: a multi-scale empirical study of the relationship between species richness 
and net primary production. Ecological Economics, 478-491. 
Crocker, T.D., Tschirhart, J., 1992. Ecosystems, externalities, and economics, 
Environ. Resour. Econ. 2, 551–567. 
Curtis, I.A., 2004. Valuing ecosystem goods and services: a new approach using a 
surrogate market and the combination of a multiple criteria analysis and a Delphi panel to 
assign weights to the attributes. Ecological Economics 50, 163-194. 
Dasgupta, P., 2001. Human well-being and the natural environment. Oxford Press 
University, Oxford. 
 21
Darbi, M., Ohlenburg, H., Herberg, A., Wende, W., Skambracks, D. and Herbert, M. 
(2009). International Approaches to Compensation for Impacts on Biological Diversity. Final 
Report. 
David, P.A., 1987. Some new standards for the economics of standardization in the 
information age, in: Dasgupta, P., Stoneman, P. (Eds.), Economic policy and technological 
performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 206-39. 
de Groot, R.S., Wilson, M.A., Boumans, R.M.J., 2002. A typology for the 
classification, description and valuation of ecosystem functions, goods and services. 
Ecological Economics 41, 393–408. 
Déprés, C., Grolleau, G., Mzoughi, N., 2008. Contracting for environmental property 
rights: the case of Vittel. Economica 75, 412-434. 
Doyen, L., De Lara, M., Ferraris, J., Pelletier, D., 2007. Sustainability of exploited 
marine ecosystems through protected areas: a viability model and a coral reef case study. 
Ecological Modelling 208, 353-366. 
Dupraz, C., Liagre, F., 2008. Agroforesterie: des arbres et des cultures. Editions 
France Agricole, Paris, 413p. 
Erkman, S., 1997. Industrial ecology : an historical overview. Journal of Cleaner 
Production 5 (1-2), 1-10. 
Farber, S., Costanza, R., Wilson, M., 2002. Economic and ecological concepts for 
valuing ecosystem services. Ecological Economics 41, 375–392. 
Fennessy, M.S., Jacobs, A.D., Kentula, M.E., 2007. An evaluation of rapid methods 
for assessing the ecological conditions of wetlands. Wetlands 27 (3), 543-560.  
Freeman, A. M. 1993. The measurement of environmental and resource values. 
Theory and methods. Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. 
Freyfogle, E.T., 2006. Goodbye to the public-private debate. Environmental Law 36 
(1), 7-24. 
Gibbs, H.K., Brown, S., Niles, J.O., Foley, J.A., 2007. Monitoring and estimating 
tropical forest carbon stocks: making REDD a reality. Environ. Res. Lett. 2 (October-
December). 
Gobert, J., 2008. Compensation territoriale, justice et inégalités environnementales aux 
Etats-Unis. Espace, Populations, Sociétés 1, 71-82. 
Godard, O., 1995. Le développement durable: paysage intellectuel. Nature, Sciences, 
Sociétés 2 (4), 309-322. 
Godard, O., Hommel, T., 2001. Contestation sociale et stratégies de développement 
industriel. Application du modèle de la gestion contestable à la production industrielle 
d'OGM. Cahiers du Laboratoire d’Économétrie de l’École Polytechnique 015, novembre. 
Goldman, R.L., Thompson, B.H., Daily, G.V., 2007. Institutional incentives for 
managing the landscape: inducing cooperation for the production of ecosystem services. 
Ecological Economics 64 (2), 333-343 
Grant, F., Weber, J., Atramentowicz, M., Hernandez, S., Frascaria-Lacoste, N., 
Houdet, J., Watt, A.D. (Eds.). 2008. Biodiversity and Industry. Report of an e-conference. 
Accessed in May 2009 on www.epbrs.org/epbrs/news/show/7. 
Gustanski, J.A., Squires, R.H., 2000. Protecting the land: conservation easements past, 
present, and future. Island Press. 
Hackl, F., Halla, M., Pruckner, G.J., 2007. Local compensation payments for agri-
environmental externalities: a panel data analysis of bargaining outcomes. European Review 
of Agricultural Economics 34 (3), 295–320. 
Hallwood, P., 2006. Contractual difficulties in environmental management: the case of 
wetland mitigation banking. Ecological Economics 63 (2-3), 446-451. 
 22
Hanson, C., Ranganathan, J., Iceland, C., Finisdore, J., 2008. The corporate ecosystem 
services review. Guidelines for identifying business risks and opportunities arising from 
ecosystem change. WRI, WBCSD and Meridian Institute.  
Hardin, G., 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162 (3859), 1243-1248. 
Hart, S.L., 1995. A natural-resource-based view of the firm. Academy of Management 
Review 20 (4), 986-1014. 
Hastings, A., Byers, J.E., Crooks, J.A., Cuddington, K., Jones, C.G., Lambrinos, J.G., 
Talley, T.S., Wilson, W.G., 2007. Ecosystem engineering in space and time. Ecology Letters 
10, 153–164. 
Holling, C.S., Gunderson, L.H., 2002. Resilience and adaptive cycles, in: Gunderson, 
L.H., Holling, C.S. (Eds.), Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and natural 
systems. Island Press, Washington D.C., 25-52. 
Holling, C.S., Gunderson, L.H., Ludwig, G.D., 2002. In quest of a theory of adaptive 
change, in: Gunderson, L.H., Holling, C.S. (Eds.), Panarchy: understanding transformations in 
human and natural systems. Island Press, Washington D.C., 3-22. 
Houdet, J., 2008. Integrating biodiversity into business strategies. The Biodiversity 
Accountability Framework. FRB – Orée, Paris. 
Houdet, J., 2008(b). A composite indicator for analyzing a company’s 
interdependences with biodiversity. Business2010 3 (3), 10-11. 
Howarth, R.B., Farber, H., 2002. Accounting for the value of ecosystem services 
Ecological Economics 41, 421–429. 
Kumar, P., Kumar, M. 2008. Valuation of ecosystems services: psycho-cultural 
perspective. Ecological Economics 64, 808-819.  
IAIA, 2005. Biodiversity in impact assessment. Special Publication Series No. 3. 
Iftikhar, U.A., Kallesoe, M., Duraiappah, A., Sriskanthan, G., Poats, S.V., Swallow, 
B., 2007. Exploring the inter-linkages among and between Compensation and Rewards for 
Ecosystem Services (CRES) and human well-being: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 1. 
ICRAF Working Paper no. 36. Nairobi: World Agroforestry Centre. 
ISIS. 2004. Is Biodiversity a Material Risk for Companies? ISIS Asset Management 
plc., London. 
Jaffe, A.B., K. Palmer, 1997. Environmental regulation and innovation: a panel data 
study. Review of Economics and Statistics 79 (4), 610-619. 
Jasch, C.M., 2008. Environmental and material flow cost accounting: principles and 
procedures. Eco-Efficiency in Industry and Science. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
Jolly, D., 1993. Management de l'environnement: le cas de Rhône-Poulenc. Direction 
& Gestion des Entreprises 144, 12-22. 
Lanoie, P., Laurent-Lucchetti, J., Johnstone, N., Ambec, S., 2007. Environmental 
policy, innovation and performance: new insights on the Porter Hypothesis. Working Paper 
GAEL 2007-07, Grenoble.   
McLaughlin, A., Mineau, P., 1995. The impact of agricultural practices on 
biodiversity. Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 55 (3), 201-213 
Marrs, R., Galtressa, K, Tong, C., Cox, E.S., Blackbird, S.J., Heyesa, T.J., Pakeman, 
R.J., Le Duc, M.G., 2007. Competing conservation goals, biodiversity or ecosystem services: 
element losses and species recruitment in a managed moorland–bracken model system. 
Journal of Environmental Management 85 (4), 1034-1047. 
Martin, S., 2004. The cost of restoration as a way of defining resilience: a viability 
approach applied to a model of lake eutrophication. Ecology and Society 9 (2), 8 p. Accessed 
in April 2008 on http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art8/. 
 23
Martinet, A.C., Reunaud, E., 2000. H2O: vers de nouvelles molécules. Sensibilité à la 
pollution et strategies dans le secteur des eaux en bouteille. Actes de la 9ème Conférence 
Internationale de l’AIMS, 24-26 mai, Montpellier. 
Martinet, V., Thébaud, O., Doyen, L., 2007. Defining viable recovery paths toward 
sustainable fisheries. Ecological Economics 64, 411-422. 
Merenlender,  A. M., Huntsinger, L., Guthey, G., Fairfax, S.K., 2004. Land trustsand 
conservation easements: who is conserving what for whom? Conservation Biology 18 (1), 65-
76. 
Métrot, F., 2005. Développement durable et entreprise responsable: formation des 
politiques de développement durable et cohérence des stratégies. Journées Développement 
Durable - AIMS du 11 mai, IAE d’Aix en Provence. Accessed in January 2008 on 
http://www.eurocontrol.int/eec/public/standard_page/conf_2005_aix_1.html. 
Miles, L. Valerie Kapos, V., 2008. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation: global land-use implications. Science 320 (5882), 1454- 
1455. 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and human well-being: 
synthesis. Island Press, Washington, DC. 
Mollicone, D., Freibauer, A., Schulze, E.D., Braatz, S., Grassi, G.,  Federici, S., 2007. 
Elements for the expected mechanisms on `reduced emissions from deforestation and 
degradation, REDD' under UNFCCC. Environ Res. Lett. 2 (October-December), 7pp. 
Mosquera-Losada, M.R., McAdam, J.H., Rigueiro-Rodriguez, A., 2005. 
Silvopastoralism and sustainable land management. CABI, Wallingford. 
Mulder, I., 2007. Biodiversity, the Next Challenge for Financial Institutions? IUCN, 
Gland. 
Muller S., 2002. Appropriate agricultural management practices required to ensure 
conservation and biodiversity of environmentally sensitive grassland sites designated under 
Natura 2000. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 89 (3), 261-266. 
Nelson, E., Mendoza, G., Regetz, J., Polasky, S., Tallis, H., Cameron, D., Chan, K., 
Daily, G., Goldstein, J., Kareiva, P., Lonsdorf, E., Naidoo, R., Ricketts, T., & Shaw, M. 
(2009). Modeling multiple ecosystem services, biodiversity conservation, commodity 
production, and tradeoffs at landscape scales. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 7 (1), 
4-11 
Norgaard, R., 1984. Coevolutionary agricultural development. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 32 (3), 525-547. 
Norgaard, R., 1985. Environmental economics. An evolutionary critique and a plea for 
pluralism. Journal of Environmental and Economic Management 12, 382-393. 
Norgaard, R., 1994. Development betrayed: the end of progress and a coevolutionary 
revisioning of the future. Routledge, London. 
OECD, 1975. The Polluter Pays Principle — Definition, Analysis, Implementation, 
Paris. 
Odum, H.T., 1983. Systems Ecology. John Wiley & Sons, New York. 
Odum, H.T., 1996. Environmental accounting: emergy and environmental decision 
making. John Wiley & Sons, New York. 
Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolsak, N., Stern, P.C., Stonich, S., Weber, E.U. (Eds.) 2002. 
The drama of the commons. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change. 
Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. National Academy Press, 
Washington DC. 
Panayotou; T., 1994. Conservation of biodiversity and economic development: the 
concept of transferable development rights. Environmental and Resource Economics 4(1): 91-
110. 
 24
Pascual, U., Perrings, C., 2007. Developing incentives and economic mechanisms for 
in situ biodiversity conservation in agricultural landscapes. Agriculture, Ecosystems and 
Environment 121, 256–268. 
Pavé, A., 2007. La nécessité du hasard. Vers une théorie synthétique de la biodiversité. 
EDP Sciences, Les Ulis. 
Pearce, D., Markandya, A., 1989. L'évaluation monétaire des avantages des politiques 
de l'environnement. OCDE, Paris. 
Pearce, D.W., Turner, R.K., 1990. Economics of natural resources and the 
environment. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead. 
Pearce, D. W., Barbier, E. B., Markandya, A., 1990. Sustainable development : 
economics and environment in the third world. Earthscan Publishers, London. 
Perrings, C., Brock, W.A., Chopra, K., Costello, C., Kinzig, A.P., Pascual, U., 
Polasky, S., Tschirhart, J., Xepapadeas, A., (to be published in 2009). The economics of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, in: Naeem, S., Bunker, D., Hector, A., Loreau, M. and 
Perrings, C. (Eds.), Biodiversity, ecosystem functioning and ecosystem services. Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming. 
Perrot-Maître, D., 2006. The Vittel payments for ecosystem services: a ‘perfect’ PES 
case? International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK. 
Persais, E., 1998. L’entreprise face aux pressions écologistes. Annales des Mines, 
Octobre, 13-23. 
Pfeffer, J., Salancik, G., 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective, New York, Harper & Row. 
Pigou, A.C., 1920. Economics of Welfare. Macmillan and Co.  
Porter, M., van der Linde, C., 1995. Toward a new conception of the environment - 
competitiveness relationship. Journal of Economic perspectives 9 (4), 97-118. 
Ragni, L., 1992. Le théorème de Coase: une relecture coasienne. Revue française 
d’économie 7 (4), 121-151. 
Roach, B., Wade, W.-W., 2006. Policy evaluation of natural resource injuries using 
habitat equivalency analysis. Ecological Economics 58 (2): 421-33. 
Ruhl, J.B., Kraft, S.E., Lant, C.L., 2007. The law and policy of ecosystem services. 
Island Press, Washington, DC. 
Raffini, E., Robertson, M., 2005. Water quality trading: what can we learn from 10 
years of wetland mitigation banking? National Wetlands Newsletter 27 (4), 3-5. 
Riordan, M., Williamson, O., 1985. Asset specificity and economic organization. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 3, 365-378. 
Robbins, L., 1932. Essay on the nature and significance of economic science. 2nd 
edition, Macmillan and co, London. 
Roger-Estrade, J., Baudry, J., Bonny, S., Deverre, C., Doussan, I., Fleury, P., Hance, 
T., Plantureux, S., 2008. L'insertion des objectifs de biodiversité dans les systèmes de 
production agricoles, in : X. Le Roux, R. Barbault, J. Baudry, F. Burel, I. Doussan, E. 
Garnier, F. Herzog, S. Lavorel, R. Lifran, J. Roger-Estrade, J.P. Sarthou, M. Trommetter 
(Eds.), Agriculture et biodiversité. Valoriser les synergies. Expertise scientifique collective, 
rapport, INRA. 
Roy, R., Whelan, R.C., 1992. Successful recycling through value-chain collaboration. 
Long Range Planning 25 (4), 62-71. 
Salamitou, J., 1989. Le coût de la prise en compte de l'environnement. Actes du 
Colloque l'Environnement et l'Entreprise organisé par l'AFITE, Paris, 85-88. 
Sarr M., Goeschl T., Swanson T. (2008). The value of conserving genetic resources 
for R&D: a survey. Ecological Economics 67 (2): 184-193. 
 25
Schlosberg, D., 2005. Environmental and ecological justice: theory and practice in the 
US, in: Barry, J., Eckersley R. (Eds.), The state and the global ecological crisis. MIT Press, 
London, 98-116. 
Shrivastava, P., 1995. The role of corporations in achieving ecological sustainability. 
Academy of Management Review 20 (4), 936-960. 
Siebert, H. 1992, Economics of the environment: theory and policy. 3rd ed., Springer-
Verlag, New York. 
Simpson, R.D., Sedjo, R.A., Reid, J.W., 1996. Valuing biodiversity for use in 
pharmaceutical research. J. Polit. Econ. 104 (1), 163– 185. 
SLWRMC (Sustainable Land and Water Resource Management Committee), 1999. 
Principles for shared investment to achieve sustainable natural resource management 
practices. Discussion Paper, Canberra. 
Stigler, G., 1971. The theory of economic regulation. Bell J. Econ. Man. Sci. 2 (1), 3-
21. 
Swingland, I.R., 2002. Capturing carbon and conserving biodiversity. The market 
approach. Earthscan. 
Tichit, M., Doyen, L., Lemel, J.Y., Renault, O., Durant, D., 2007. A co-viability 
model of grazing and bird community management in farmland. Ecological Modelling 206, 
277-293. 
Trommetter, M., Weber, J., 2003. Biodiversité et mondialisation : défi global, 
réponses locales. Politique Etrangère 2, 381-393. 
Trommetter, M., Deverre, C., Doussan, I., Fleury, P., Herzog, F., Lifran, R., 2008. 
Biodiversité, agriculture et politiques publiques, in: Le Roux, X., Barbault, R., Baudry, J., 
Burel, F., Doussan, I., Garnier, E., Herzog, F., Lavorel, S., Lifran, R., Roger-Estrade, J., 
Sarthou, J.P., Trommetter, M. (Eds.), Agriculture et biodiversité. Valoriser les synergies. 
Expertise scientifique collective, rapport, INRA (France). 
Troy, A., Wilson, M.A., 2006. Mapping ecosystem services: practical challenges and 
opportunities linking GIS and value transfer. Ecological Economics 60 (2), 435-449. 
Tucker, G., 2006. A review of biodiversity conservation performance measures. 
Earthwatch Institute, Oxford. 
Turner, R.K., Paavola, J., Cooper, P., Farber, S., Jessamy, V., Georgiou, S., 2003. 
Valuing nature: lessons learned and future research directions. Ecological Economics 46, 
493–510. 
Turner, WR, Brandon, K., Brooks, T.M., Costanza, R., Fonseca, G.A.B., Portela, R., 
2007. Global conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Bioscience 57 (10), 868–
873. 
Turner, R.K., Daily, G.C., 2008. The ecosystem services framework and natural 
capital conservation. Environ Resource Econ 39, 25–35. 
UNEP FI, 2008. Biodiversity and ecosystem services: bloom or bust? A document of 
the UNEP FI Biodiversity & Ecosystem Services Work Stream (BESW), Geneva. 
Viardot E., 1993. L’intégration des contraintes de l’environnement naturel dans les 
choix stratégiques des grandes entreprises chimiques. Thèse de doctorat en Sciences de 
Gestion. 
Vivien, F.-D., 1994. Economie et écologie. La Découverte, Paris. 
Waage, S., Stewart, E., Armstrong, K., 2008. Measuring corporate impact on 
ecosystems: a comprehensive review of new tools. Business for Social Responsibility. 
Walley, N., Whitehead, B., 1994. It’s not easy being green. Harvard Business Review, 
May-June, 46-52. 
Wallace, K.J., 2007. Classification of ecosystem services: problems and solutions. 
Biological Conservation 139, 235 –246. 
 26
Walker, B., Meyers., J.A., 2004. Thresholds in ecological and social–ecological 
systems: a developing database. Ecology and Society 9 (2), 16p. Accessed in June 2009 on 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art3. 
Weber, J., 1996. Gestão de recursos renovàveis : fundamentos teòricos de um 
programa de pesquisas; Veira, P.F., Weber, J. (Eds.), Gestão de recursos naturais renoaveis e 
desenvolvimento : novos desafios para a pesquisa ambiental. Sao Paolo, Cortez Editora, Trad. 
de Pontbriand-Veira, A.S. et de Lassus, C., 115-146. 
Weber, J., 2002a. L’évaluation contingente : les valeurs ont-elle un prix ? Académie 
d’Agriculture, décembre. 
Weber, J., 2002b. Enjeux économiques et sociaux du développement durable, in: 
Barbault, R., Cornet, A., Jouzel, J., Mégie, G., Sachs, I., Weber, J. (Eds.), Johannesburg, 
sommet mondial du développement durable 2002. Quels enjeux ? Quelle contribution des 
scientifiques ? Ministère de l’Ecologie et du Développement Durable, Paris, 13-44. 
Weber, J., 2009. Un monde plus responsable: green economy and nouvelles 
régulations, ressorts d’une nouvelle croissance ?  Prospective Stratégique 35 (Juin-Juillet), 42-
48. 
Weber J., Revéret, J.P., 1993. La gestion des relations sociétés-natures : modes 
d'appropriation et processus de décision. Le Monde Diplomatique, Collection Savoirs 2, 
Environnement et Développement. 
Wilson, M.A., Hoehn, J.P., 2006. Valuing environmental goods and services using 
benefit transfer: the state of the art and science. Ecological Economics 60 (2), 335-342. 
Williamson, O., 1981. The modern corporation: origin, evolution, attributes. Journal of 
Economic Literature 19 (December), 1537-68. 
Wolf, S.A., Primmer, E., 2006. Between incentives and action: a pilot study of 
biodiversity conservation competencies for multifunctional forest management in Finland. 
Society and Natural Resources 19: 845-861. 
Zhu, Q., Cote, R.P., 2004. Integrating green supply management into embryonic eco-
industrial development: a case study of the Guitang Group. Journal of Cleaner Production 12, 
1025-1035. 
 
 27
